On May 20, an article titled “Croats and Serbs were as important for the outcome of World War II as the breast size of a radio porn actress” was published in the „Dubrovački dnevnik“ (available here, archived here), authored by journalist Maro Marušić. Although the text was published as a column, which allows for a subjective and satirical approach to the topic, the author makes claims that are presented as historical facts. When such claims relate to events of broader social significance, their verification is important for understanding and preserving a historically grounded public discourse. Specifically, the text repeatedly states as a proven historical fact, noticeable already in the title, that the war in the Yugoslav territory from 1941 to 1945 was irrelevant to the global course of World War II. However, military and political historiography emphasizes the opposite conclusions.
Although Marušić, while presenting a series of lesser-known facts about wartime events around the world in an effort to legitimize his familiarity with the topic, writes that in the Second World War “Every country, even the smallest one (…), every single corner of the land, even the icy expanses of the north, was extremely strategically important (…) except – Croatia and Serbia!“, the front in the territory of Yugoslavia had a number of decisive elements that influenced the broader development of the war in the European, and even global, context. One key event was the coup in Belgrade on March 27, 1941, which overthrew the pro-Axis government. In response, Hitler chose to punish Yugoslavia by launching a military intervention in the Balkans[1], resulting in the postponement of the planned invasion of the Soviet Union. Since the invasion of Yugoslavia and then Greece in April 1941 delayed the start of Operation Barbarossa for several weeks, many historians identify this factor as crucial to Germany’s failure in its campaign on Moscow, because military operations in the USSR started later and entered winter without a decisive victory[2] Germany’s decision to delay the attack on the USSR until the Balkans were secured highlights how crucial they considered the region—reflecting Hitler’s aim to establish a stable land corridor to Greece and diminish British presence[3] there. Also, Yugoslavia’s mineral resources, such as bauxite and coal, strengthened the strategic importance of this area[4] from Germany’s perspective.
The later development of the situation on this front also influenced the strategies of the Western Allies. Firstly, it should not be forgotten that the Allies long considered the option of a direct landing in the Balkans as the “soft underbelly of Europe“,[5] but later abandoned it in favor of the Normandy landing. However, the Allies’ arming and supplying of partisans via air bridges and the presence of their representatives in partisan headquarters shows their understanding of the region’s importance in the fight against the Axis powers. Finally, the geopolitical significance of Yugoslavia as a bridge between East and West, a passage between Central Europe on one side, and the Aegean, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East on the other, remained clear[6] to all warring parties in Europe, with control over this area meaning control over important communication and supply lines.
Similarly, despite Marušić’s claim formulated as“If all the inhabitants of the area from Vardar to Triglav from 1939 to 1945 had only sat in the shade of pine trees and played chess, nothing in the course of World War II would have changed. The Allies would have squeezed Germany from the east and west, it would have capitulated, the war would have ended, and everything would have been the same without the Neretva, Sutjeska, Bleiburg…,” documented data shows that it was precisely the Yugoslav partisans, as one of the most effective resistance movements in occupied Europe[7], whose constant harassment of Axis forces and disruption of their communication lines had a major impact on the dynamics of European battlefields. Forced to engage a large number of troops in Yugoslavia, troops that could have otherwise been sent to the East or used to defend Western Europe from the Allied invasion, the Wehrmacht, during 1943 and 1944, engaged an average of 30 divisions in attempts to suppress partisan resistance, i.e., tens of thousands of soldiers.[8] By constantly carrying out diversions, sabotage, and attacks on railways, bridges, communications, and infrastructure, the partisans, on the one hand, hindered the Axis logistics in supplying German units in Greece and the Mediterranean, and on the other hand, facilitated Allied air forces in bombing key targets by providing reliable local information. Therefore, the impact of the partisan movement in the European context, due to its military, political, and strategic role, was exceptional and significantly contributed to the Allies’ victory and the weakening of the Axis powers, with battles like those on the Neretva or Sutjeska being key examples that can support [9]
these claims. This is evident from the stance the Allies themselves took after 1943 towards the partisans, providing them with political and logistical support and arming them, justifying all this by saying they were the key land force in Europe. The Soviet side also saw the partisans as extremely important, recognizing them, along with the Red Army, as the only important army in Europe dominated by the communist party, an opportunity to expand their own ideological and military influence, as well as to create a security belt. [10] Also, it is important to mention the fact that it was the partisans who succeeded in liberating and controlling large parts of the territory, where they established National Liberation Committees, schools, healthcare, and various government institutions, a precedent in occupied Europe where no other resistance movement had so systematically governed an area [11]. Furthermore, the situation where, despite Allied help, Yugoslavia, unlike many European countries, liberated itself from the occupiers and collaborators mostly with its own forces, as seen from the fact that cities like Zagreb or Sarajevo were liberated in actions entirely coordinated by the partisan army,[12] again demonstrates the moral and political weight with which its resistance movement was viewed in the European context.
Although Marušić claims that the territory of Yugoslavia was “the least important for the final outcome of the greatest war in history,” a number of extensive studies agree that the path to victory in Europe, without the Yugoslav front, would have been slower, more costly, and bloodier for the Allies, and the geopolitical picture of post-war Europe would have been different.[13] Namely, without the need to keep tens of divisions in this region, the Wehrmacht would have been able to withstand the Allies on all other fronts for a longer time, potentially preventing some of their victories. Also, without internal resistance, the Allied forces would have been forced to directly intervene in the Balkans, which would have meant additional casualties and costs for them. For all these reasons, the front in Yugoslavia must undoubtedly be seen as one of the decisive ones. While it did not directly determine the outcome of the conflict, it constantly changed its dynamics, exhausted Axis resources, and gave momentum to the anti-fascist movement in Europe. In the end, its importance is reflected in Yugoslavia’s post-war political position and its relationship with both the West and the East.
The claim that the Yugoslav front was irrelevant to the outcome of World War II is false, as numerous historical analyses and documented data confirm its significant impact on military dynamics, strategic decisions of the Allies, and the final victory over the Axis powers.
[1] Keegan, John. The Second World War (Sydney: Hutschinson, 1989): 113.
[2] compare: Blau, George. Invasion Balkans!: The German Campaign in the Balkans, Spring 1941 (Shippensburg: Burd Street Press, 1997) and Fugate, Bryan. Operation Barbarossa (Novato: Presidio Press, 1984).
[3] Keegan, John. The Second World War (Sydney: Hutschinson, 1989): 128.
[4] Blau, George. Invasion Balkans!: The German Campain in the Balkans, Spring 1941 (Shippensburg: Burd Street Press, 1997): 52.
[5] compare Matloff, Maurice. Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1943–1944 (Scott’s Walley: CreateSpace, 2015): 18. poglavlje i Correll, John. Churchill’s Southern Strategy (https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/0113churchill/, accessed 21.6.2025)
[6] compare Keegan, John. The Second World War (Sydney: Hutschinson, 1989); Rieber, Alfred. Storms over the Balkans during the Second World War (Oxford University Press, 2022) i O’Brien, Phillip. The Strategists (London: Penguin, 2024)
[7] according to Rieber, Alfred. Storms over the Balkans during the Second World War (Oxford University Press, 2022), Chapter 2.
[8] Blau, George. Invasion Balkans!: The German Campain in the Balkans, Spring 1941 (Shippensburg: Burd Street Press, 1997): 79.
[9] compare Rieber, Alfred. Storms over the Balkans during the Second World War (Oxford University Press, 2022) i Keegan, John. The Second World War (Sydney: Hutschinson, 1989)
[10] Ramet, Sabrina. The Three Yugoslavias (Indiana University Press, 2006): 159.
[11] Goldstein, Ivo. Hrvatska 1918.-2008. (Zagreb: Znanje, 2008): 343.
[12] ibid. 368.
[13] compare. Rieber, Alfred. Storms over the Balkans during the Second World War (Oxford University Press, 2022); Ramet, Sabrina. The Three Yugoslavias (Indiana University Press, 2006); Roberts, Andrew. The Storm of War (New York: Harper Perennial, 2009); and Tomašević, Jozo. War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941–1945 (Zagreb: Novi liber, 2010).
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